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Global crisis and its implications on the political 
transformation in China1  
 
MÁRIA CSANÁDI – HAIRONG LAI – FERENC GYURIS 
 
“What we possessed in the past  
doesn’t necessarily belong 
 to us now;  
what we possess now  
may not be ours  
forever.”  
 
Hu Jintao’s address, 




This paper analyzes the impact of global financial and economic crisis on the process of system 
transformation in China. First, it details the direct impact of global growth on macroeconomic 
development  and  its  indirect  impact  on  economic  transformation.  Second,  it  analyzes  the 
direct  impact  of  global  crisis  on  macroeconomic  decline  and  its  indirect  impact  on  the 
prospects of political transformation. The paper builds on the basic principles and ideas of the 
Interactive  Party State  model2  to  introduce  the  concept  of  transformation  dynamics.  This 
concept implies the direction and speed of change of the retreating party state sphere and the 
emergence of the field outside of it during the process of transformation. Using this concept a 
statistical survey was carried out on the economic transformation of the Chinese party state.3 
Results  reveal  the  disparities  of  the  dynamics  of  transformation  in  time,  in  space,  and  at 
different levels of aggregation between 1999 and 2004. A dominant type of transformation 
dynamics is revealed during this period and the shift of dominant type within that period, 
                                                        
1 The paper was inspired by the questions raised by Kun Chin Lin in Singapore and the participants of the comparative economic 
systems seminar in Kyoto in September 2008, especially Hiroshi Tanaka, Takumi Horibayashi, Satoshi Mizobata. We are grateful 
to the participants of the  Contemporary China seminar series co organized by China Centre with St Antony's Asian Studies Centre 
in Oxford in March 2009 for insightful discussion. The financial support of the Hungarian National Research Fund is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
2 Csanádi, Maria, Self consuming Evolutions: A Model on the structure, Self reproduction and Self consumption of Party state 
Systems Tested in Romania, Hungary and China. Academic Press, Budapest, 2006 
3 Csanádi, Maria Spatial Disparities of system transformation in China. Book manuscript, 2009  
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sensitive  to  the  trend  of  certain  economic  indicators.  Based  on  those  findings,  the  paper 
projects  the  dominance  of  another  type  of  transformation  dynamics  as  a  result  of  the 
consequences  of  global  crisis.  It  also  outlines  the  possible  impact  of  this  dynamics  on  the 
premises of political transformation.  
 
Keywords:  system  transformation,  China,  economic  transformation,  political 
transformation, spatial disparities in system transformation 
 
JEL: B52, D85, N10, P2, P3, P41, P52  
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A globális válság hatása a kínai rendszer politikai 
átalakulására4 
 




A  cikk  a  globális  pénzügyi  és  gazdasági  válság  hatását  vizsgálja  a  kínai 
rendszerátalakulásra.  Először  a  globális  növekedés  közvetlen  hatását  vizsgálja  a 
makrogazdasági  növekedésre,  és  közvetett  hatását  a  gazdasági  átalakulásra. 
Másodikként elemzi a globális válság közvetlen hatását a makrogazdasági hanyatlásra 
és közvetett hatását a politikai átalakulás megindulására. A cikk az Interaktív Pártálami 
Modell5  alapelveire  és  gondolataira  építve  vezeti  be  a  transzformációs  dinamika 
fogalmát. E fogalom az átalakulás folyamatában visszahúzódó pártállami szféra és a 
kibontakozó hálón kívüli szféra egymáshoz viszonyított irányát és sebességét takarja. E 
fogalom birtokában statisztikailag elemeztük a kínai pártállam gazdasági átalakulását.6 
Az eredmények a transzformációs dinamika eltéréseire világítanak rá időben, térben és 
aggregációban 1999 és 2004 között.  A vizsgált időszak alatt az eltérő dinamikák között 
mégis volt domináns. Időszakon belül a domináns transzformációs dinamika változik, 
ami  összefüggésbe  hozható  bizonyos  gazdasági  mutatók  változására  való 
érzékenységével. Az eredmények alapján a cikk a globális válság közvetlen hatásaként 
kialakuló  gazdasági  visszaesésből  újtípusú  transzformációs  dinamika  dominanciáját 
vetíti  előre.  Felvázolja  emellett  e  dinamika  hatását  a  politikai  átalakulás 
megindulásának lehetőségeire. 
 
Tárgyszavak: rendszer átalakulás, Kína, gazdasági átalakulás, politikai átalakulás, 
területi eltérések a rendszer átalakulásban 
                                                        
4 Ezt a cikket Kun Chin Lin által Szingapurban feltett kérdés inspirálta, valamint a Kyotoban  "Comparative economic systems 
seminar" résztvevőinek, különösen Hiroshi Tanaka, Takumi Horibayashi, Satoshi Mizobata professzorok hozzászólásai 2008 
szeptemberében. Köszönettel tartozunk az Oxford Univesrity China Centre és a St Antony's Asian Studies Centre által közösen 
szervezett  szeminárium  sorozat  résztvevőinek igényes hozzászólásaikért,  ahol  a  cikk  témájában  Csanádi  Mária  2009 
márciusában előadott. A kutatást az OTKA finanszírozta. 
5 Csanádi, Maria, Self consuming Evolutions: A Model on the structure, Self reproduction and Self consumption of Party state 
Systems Tested in Romania, Hungary and China. Academic Press, Budapest, 2006 
6 Csanádi, Maria Spatial Disparities of system transformation in China. Book manuscript, 2009  
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INTRODUCTION 
Three  decades  since  post Mao  leaders  embarked  on  economic  and  institutional  reforms  to 
improve economic and social conditions, and opened up China to integrate the country into the 
world  economy.  The  deepening  integration  took  place  in  an  international  environment  of 
overall growth that in late 2008 turned into global recession. It is evident that opposite trends 
have direct opposite influence on any country’s development. It is also evident that under crisis 
periods actual governments and represented political regimes are under critical situation and 
might  crumble.  It  is  however  questionable  to  what  extent  global  crisis  influences  China’s 
system  transformation.  Our  pre supposition  is  that  while  overall  growth  directly  fuelled 
domestic  economic  growth  and  indirectly  contributed  to  the  acceleration  of  economic 
transformation, overall recession will directly fuel domestic economic deceleration and might 
indirectly contribute to the acceleration of political transformation. The aim of this paper is to 
detect the interactions of direct and indirect impacts and its spatial disparities.   
  7 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHINA 
 
Integration  and  reforms  brought  about  exuberant  economic  growth  and  progress  in  social 
conditions during the last three decades, despite being punctuated by various critical turning 
points.  
 
Figure 1.  
Signs of development and increasing integration into the  




Compiled from the data of University of Michigan 
All China Data Source, National Statistics   
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Figure one reflects this growth in GDP, export, import, investment, and foreign exchange 
reserves. The same tendency of the actually utilized FDI is masked by the large scale unit of 
this chart, but if we strike it in smaller unit (100 million rather than billion) the same tendency 
is evident (Figure 2). 
Figure 2.  
Quantity of actually utilized FDI in China (1990–2006)  
 
 
Compiled from the data of China Statistical Yearbook 2007 , Tab. 18 14 
 
Economic  policy  strategies  on  reforms  and  opening  up  fuelled  double  digit  growth  in 
industrial production, in GDP and in per capita GDP. Owing to steadily rising FDI inflow the 
development of eastern regions skyrocketed and spilled over to overall domestic production. 
Extraordinary pace of infrastructure building and urbanization accompanied the development. 
Growing exports, industry and services absorbed about 130 millions of migrant workers from 
poor rural regions. Investment climate and production steadily increased and maintained high 




                                                        
7 Angresano, The state of China’s economy 2009, The real-world economics review, issue no. 48 , 2008, p. 339 
http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue48/Angresano48.pdf  
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Improvements are reflected also in social indicators. For example, standard of living of the 
whole  population  increased  enormously,  over  250  millions  were  lifted  out  from  absolute 
poverty due to rural reforms and industrial development.8 The high rate of adult illiteracy has 
been decreasing in giant steps to 10 percent in 2005. Average life expectancy reached 72.5 in 
2006, education enrolment ratio is almost 70 percent. The rise of Human Development index 
(HDI) was the highest in the world during the past 30 years, ranked 81st among 177 countries 
in  2006.  Even  faster  improvements  were  demonstrated  in  China’s  position  in  Gender 
Development Index (GDI) and Human Poverty Index.9  
  Rapid  growth  however  also  brought  to  the  fore  social  disparities10  that  have  been 
mounting over time. For example, Gini coefficient has almost doubled since 1981, to become 
one of the highest in the world (47.4). Income ratio between rural and urban areas increased: 
from 1:2.6 in the late 1990s to 1:3.3 in 2007 respectively11. Gap was widening between migrants 
and non migrant peasants, migrants and urban dwellers, women incomes compared to men.12 
Recently, the 2007–2008 steep rises in inflation was fueled by serious increases in the price of 
food and crude oil, with growing public concerns also over rising prices of education and health 
services as well medicine and in real estate.  
  Mounting social disparities in time were interacting with those in space: China has one 
of the highest degrees of regional income inequality in the world. Spatial dispersion of Human 
Development Index of provinces varied between of the 28th and 130th in the world country 
rank in 200613. Spatial differences in GDP per capita at provincial level were almost tenfold in 
2006.14 Original gap in the national level GDP between the western and central regions in 1978 
has further increased by 2006. Differences between east and west belts in per capita GDP 
during the same period have risen from one and a half fold to almost threefold. Unbalanced 
economic  development  between  coastal  and  western  and  central  regions  brought  about 
                                                        
8  Angresano, The state of China’s .., referring to Angresano, 2005. "China's development strategy: A game of chess that 
countered orthodox development advice," The Journal of Socio-Economics, Volume 34, pp. 471 498. p. 471   
9  UNDP, 2008. Human Development Report 2007/2008 "Fighting climate change," 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN_Complete.pdf, China Quarterly Update, December 2008, 
http://go.worldbank.org/4Z57X7K3M0 
10 The difference between average urban and rural incomes was 3.3 folds in 2007 to the detriment of the rural society. This 
income gap was the largest since the reform and opening up of China in 1978. Further gaps emerged in other dimensions of the 
society: in 2004 the share in consumption of the lowest ten percent income strata of the society was 1.6 percent, while that of the 
highest ten percent income group consumed 35 percent. www.exxun.com/China/e_ec.html (2008)   
11  “China's Exports Probably Declined Most in a Decade in December” referring to a representative of the National Development 
and Reform Commission, 01 09 2009 http://news.stonebtb.com/Global_Trade/15641 China s Exports Probably Declined Most 
in a Decade in December.shtml 
12 Sicular, Terry, Yue Ximing, Björn Gustafsson and Li Shi. “The Urban Rural Income Gap and Inequality in China.” Review of 
Income and Wealth 53, 1 (2007): 93 126.; Khan, Azizur Rahman, Growth, inequality and poverty in China: A Comparative Study 
of the Experience in the Periods Before and After the Asian Crisis 
13 UNDP Human Development Report China 2007/08 and UNDP Human Development Report 2008. Data on 2007 is 
from www.exxun.com/China/e_ec.html (2008) 
14 These data may be found in the more recent reports. UNDP Human Development Report China 2007/08 p. 140.  
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spatially  unbalanced  migration.15  Spatial  disparities  however  did  not  cause  explicit  social 
tensions. Grievances were localized, escalating in number and scope due to local corruption, 
police abuse, to lay offs at closed down, privatized or rationalized SOEs and TVEs,16 forced 
land transfers and confiscations, by local rent seeking authorities.17  
However, so far, growing tensions were nested in a dynamically advancing macroeconomic 
context and general improvement of social conditions. These circumstances allowed economic 
policy makers to smooth tensions, keep mass grievances localized and depoliticized. They also 
supported the party’s capacity to maintain investment and consumption climate and pace of 
economic growth, and to partially absorb new entrants and laid off workers. Besides economic 
growth and marketization the state was active in implementing numerous remedies to reduce 
income and regional gaps that maintained and supported party legitimacy.  
 
ECONOMIC GROWTH, SHIFTING TRANSFORMATION DYNAMICS AND ECONOMIC 
TRANSFORMATION 
 
Rapid economic growth in China was driven by increasing integration into the world economy 
accompanied  by  structural  economic  and  institutional  changes  as  a  result  of  reforms  and 
integration. Structural changes contributed to systemic transformation of the economic sub 
field: to the gradual retreat of party state relationships and to the emergence of the market 
relationships. (Fig.3) 
                                                        
15 Demurger, Sylvie, Li Shi, Martin Fournier, Wei Zhong, “Economic liberalization with rising segmentation on China’s urban 
labor market” Asian Economic Papers, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 5(3), pages 58 101, June 2006 
16 Cai, Yongshun, Power Structure and Regime Resilience: 
Contentious Politics in China. B.J.Pol.S. 38, 000–000 Copyright © 2007 Cambridge University Press. UK; Cai, Yonshun, 
„Conflicts and Modes of Action in China” The China Journal , Issue 59, January, 2008, pp. 89 109 
17 Zhang, Xiaobo, “Fiscal Decentralization and Political Centralization in China: Implications for Regional Inequality, 2005, DSGD 
Discussion papers No. 21 
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Figure 3.  









We argue that the process of economic transformation may be expressed with the dynamics 
of change in the relationship between the market field and the party state field. We build on 
the Interactive Party state (IPS) model to define the theoretical background of this concept. 
The IPS model is an analytical framework to compare the similarities and differences in the 
structure, operation and transformation of party state systems.  18 The model introduces the 
concept of system transformation as the process of retreat of the party state network and the 
emergence of the new system outside of it. According to the model, retreat and emergence may 
take place first either in economic or political subfield, or even simultaneously, depending on 
the  specifics  of  power  distribution  in  the  party state  network.  The  different  sequence  also 
determines  the  different  economic  conditions  under  which  economic  or  political 
transformation is taking place first, second or parallel and the different political conditions 
under which economic or political transformation is taking place first, second, or parallel.19   
In  the  Chinese  case,  first  economic  transformation  (retreat  and  emergence)  was  so far 
occurring in a context of macroeconomic growth and in an authoritarian political regime. The 
retreat meant the decentralization of decisions over allocations, rationalization of management 
that brought about the abolishment of the institutional background of compulsory planning. It 
also included the close down of state owned and collective enterprises or their privatization, 
and  the  stripping  of  state  values  through  the  transfer  of  competitive  capital,  product, 
                                                        
18  Systemic  self-similarities  described  by  the  model  allow  for  the  comparison  of  party states  and  their  transformation  in 
different time, space and levels of aggregation. Thus, due to systemic self similarities different individual characteristics as 
geopolitical location, size, cultural, historical traditions, economic and social structure, level of development do not inhibit 
comparison etc. 
19 Csanádi, Self-consuming Evolutions…, 2006  
  12 
organization  and  manpower  to  the  emerging  market  field.  The  emerging  field  outside  the 
party state  context  meant  increasing  decentralization  of  decision making  over  production 
factors  both  in  agriculture  and  industry  that  provided  larger  room  for  man  oeuvre  for 
economic units. Development of the emergent market was also fuelled by the dual track price 
system, the growing number and scope of joint ventures with foreign capital, the green field 
foreign and domestic private and privatized enterprises, transferred values from the party 
state sphere and the developing market friendly institutional background.  
It is very hard to quantify this two fold process without simplifying it, moreover, not all 
components may be quantified and what is in principle quantifiable, in practice is not available 
statistically. In order to still simply quantify the above two fold process we have split economic 
units into two: to those whose activity depends more on the market and to those whose activity 
depends more from the context of the party state sphere.20 We have measured the dynamics of 
the two processes by the only available indicator both at national, provincial and prefecture 
level  for  both  spheres:  the  gross  output  value  (GOV).  Figure  4.  shows  the  trends  of  GDP 
development and the simplified characteristics of economic transformation.  
Figure 4.  
Growth of GDP and the output of the economic units  
belonging to the emergent field and the party-state context  
 
 
Compiled from the data of University of Michigan 
All China Data Center, National Statistics 
                                                        
20 This group includes the collective units that similarly depend on the party and state management as those of the strictly or 
majority state owned economic units. Thus, this split does not overlap the classifications according to property rights.  
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Dynamics on Figure 4. reflect overall macroeconomic GDP growth which, according to the 
chart, is supposedly overwhelmingly owed to the exuberant growth pace of the market field. 
Same causes might have been interacting on the acceleration depicted in the case of several 
other  economic  indicators  at  national  level  (see  Fig.  1.  and  2.  on  exports  and  imports, 
investments in fixed assets, foreign exchange reserves and actually utilized FDI). 
Figure 4. reveals that emerging market field shows different tendencies in time, similarly to 
the pace of the indicators mentioned above on Fig. 1.: it gathers momentum starting from 
2002, strengthening the previous trend. Meanwhile, from 2002 on, the trend in the output of 
the units pertaining to the party state context also begins to increase, switching from so far 
decline.21  
Based  on  the  concept  of  transformation,  an  operationalized  tool  was  introduced:  the 
concept of the “dynamics of transformation”. The dynamics of transformation allows for the 
measurement of the multiple varieties in the direction and speed of the emergent field relative 
to  that  of  the  retreating  network.22  Relying  on  this  classification,  we  have  carried  out  a 
statistical survey on the dynamics of transformation of the economic sub field of the Chinese 
party state.  The  survey  on  transformation  dynamics  extends  from  1999  to  2004,  during  a 
period  of  global  and  macroeconomic  growth,  measured  in  the  context  of  economic 
transformation first in an authoritarian political regime. We have analyzed the different types 
of transformation dynamics, their disparities in space and shifts in time.  
Based on the combination of growth, stagnation and decline of the two fields, the different 
types of transformation dynamics are classified in Table 1. The table strikes the variations of 
the simultaneous change of direction of the party state context and that of the market field. 23 
                                                        
21 According to our interpretation, this was the starting impact of China’s deeper integration into the world economy through 
entering the WTO. 
22 If there were data on sub national level on the emergent market field and the party state field, relative direction of changes as 
well as speed (transformation dynamics) could have been detected with the changes of other indicators than those of gross 
output value. Results, due to the strictly parallel trends of these major indicators on national level supposedly would have given 
similar dominant types of transformation dynamics, though might have reflected a different configuration in space. 
23 Based on those data and the above table we have distinguished thirteen types of transformation dynamics that contain relative 
speed and direction, independent of the size of the output: when both fields grow either in equal pace (GGa), or one of them 
grows faster (GGb and GGc); when both fields decline either in equal pace (DDa), or one of them declines faster (DDb and DDc); 
when only one of the fields grows while the other declines (GD) and (DG); when only one stagnates and the other declines or 
grows (SG) (SD), (DS), (DG); when both stagnate (SS). Real variations of these dynamics were in practice nine, and from those, 
there were two dominant types at national, provincial and prefecture levels in the examined period.  
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Table 1.  
Calculation of the different types of transformation dynamics24 
 
 
Using the above terms and types of transformation dynamics on national level we may 
detect an absolute retreat of the network with growing emergent field outside the network and 
declining party state field until 2002 (GD). After 2002 the relationship changes: the absolute 
retreat shifts to relative retreat of the network, meaning higher speed of growth of those within 
the emerging market field compared to a slower growth of the party state field (GG). 25  The 
following tables and maps reveal the disparities of the types of the dynamics of transformation 
in space, in time and at different levels of aggregation.  
Table 2. strikes the distribution of provinces (and within those, the output of economic 
units pertaining to the network and the market field) according to each type of transformation 
dynamics. Statistical results point to the fact that in 90 percent of the cases emergent field was 
growing, while half of the cases the output of those pertaining to the party state context was 
stagnant.  This  will  determine  the  dominant  type  of  transformation  dynamics  during  this 
period:  the  emerging  market  field  and  stagnating  party state  context, as  a  kind  of  relative 
retreat of the network.26  
                                                        
24 Intervals are only likely too large, since percentages do not cover year by year growth but overarch five years. In this case the 
intervals are sufficiently small to measure growth, stagnation and change. 
25 In case we examine the number of economic units in these two spheres (Csanádi, 2009) there is no shift in 2002 but the former 
tendency of absolute decline of those belonging to the party state context is further prolonged. 
26 This is when the emergent market sphere is increasing while the party state sphere is retreating.  
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Table 2.  
Provincial level transformation dynamics between 1999 and 2005  
 
 
Compiled from the data of University of Michigan 
All China Data Center, Provincial Statistics 
Map 1.  
The configuration of different types of transformation dynamics  
on provincial level between 1999 and 2005  
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Compiled from the data of University of Michigan 
All China Data Center, Provincial Statistics 
 
Map 1. reveals the configuration of the different types of transformation dynamics in space. 
According to the map the different types are distributed unevenly in space, though there are 
large clusters of similar dynamics overarching provinces. Spatial distribution of the different 
types  of  dynamics  does  not  follow  conventional  regional  divisions  and  trends  of  gradually 
declining  developmental  level  according  to  coastal,  central  and  western  or  northern  and 
southern larger regions. Clusters of stagnation of the output of the economic units belonging to 
the party state context advance from coastal region deep to the inland, others showing relative 
retreat of the network extend from some central to western provinces, absolute retreat of the 
network is scattered among all larger regional divisions. 
Map 2. reflecting prefecture level reveals a much more differentiated configuration. Few 
provinces are homogeneous: we may detect provinces that have multiple types of prefecture 
level  transformation  dynamics,  neighboring  opposite  dynamics  and  insulated  prefectures 
surrounded by prefectures with different homogeneous dynamics. Though smaller or larger 
clusters  occur,  they  generally  do  not  overlap  provincial  boundaries.  The  coastal  region  at 
prefecture level is not at all homogeneous. In general, based on correlation and significance 
measurements27 at prefecture level, there is no correlation among the types of transformation 
dynamics and absolute economic indicators reflecting level of development (Csanádi, 2009). 
This  fact  might  misguide  economic  policy  interventions  to  decrease  tensions  based  on 
conventional developmental factors and larger regional divisions.  
                                                        
27 Connection was measured with Eta square and significance test among the types of transformation dynamics and several 
indicators of level of economic development to test whether the difference among the economic indicators of those units that 
pertain  to  one  type  of  transformation  dynamics is  smaller  than  the  difference  of  those  showing  different  transformation 
dynamics.  
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Map 2. and Table 3.  
Configuration and distribution of the types of transformation dynamics  
at prefecture level between 1999 and 2004  
 
Compiled from the data of University of Michigan 
All China Data Center, City Statistics 
 
The  frequency  of  absolute  retreat  of  the  network  is  dominant  at  prefecture  level.  This 
harmonizes with the trends and mutual relationship in the changes at national level (see Fig. 
3). However, while at provincial level there were practically no other types of transformation 
dynamics but the dominant ones, prefecture level shows much larger variance.  
Splitting the period according to the changes detected on national level, data reveal the 
same shift in the type of dominant dynamics both at provincial and prefecture levels, from 
absolute  retreat  to  relative  retreat  of  the  network.  According  to  the  Table  4  representing 
provincial  level,  the  two  dominant  transformation  dynamics,  containing  the  growth  of  the 
emergent field, suppressed all others. They were even growing in percentage from one period 
to  the  other:  from  93.55  to  100.00  percent  respectively.  These  numbers  support  the 
supposeition  that  macroeconomic  growth  was  due  to  the  growth  of  the  emergent  field 
accompanied by the decline, stagnation and growth of the party state context.   
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Table 4.  
Shifting dominant transformation dynamics at provincial level 
 within 1999 and 2005  
 
Note: Rows contain the dynamics of the emergent field,  
columns that of the network. 
Compiled from the data of University of Michigan 
All China Data Center, City Statistics 
 
Comparing the differences in the spatial distribution of the two periods on Map 3a. and 3b. 
Spatial  configuration  of  the  different  types  of  transformation  dynamics  demonstrates  the 
chances of the shift of dynamics from any type to any other type within the earmarked period. 
Absolute retreat may shift to relative, and relative to absolute retreat (Anhui, Henan, Qinghai). 
Even  opposite  direction  shifts  have  happened  in  Guizhou  and  Ningxia  where  the  pace  of 
growth of Emergence and Network was reversed: the decline of the Emergent field turned to 
growth while the growth of the Network turned to stagnation, or in the other case, decline. One 
can also see that shifts were so frequent that behind each type of dynamics different provinces 
are located in the two periods. Only four provinces from the 31 did not shift transformation 
dynamics: Jilin, Tibet and Yunnan provinces, where the emergent field grew steadily while 
stagnation  of  the  network  did  not  change;  the  fourth  was  Shaanxi,  which  continued  with 
relative retreat of the net also in the second period. Except for Fujian, the dynamics of the 
whole east coast turned from absolute retreat to relative, suggesting a spill over effect. Fujian 
province, which was already insulated among the cluster of provinces with absolute retreat 
with its growing Emergent field and stagnating Network in the first period, instead of shifting  
  19 
to relative retreat as its counterparts, shifted to absolute retreat.  28 Moreover, between 1999 
and 2005 nearly all types of transformation dynamics occurred along the coastal provinces or 
attached to those, though the majority is steadily the dominant relative and absolute retreat.   
Map 3a.  
Spatial distribution of different types of transformation dynamics  
between 1999 and 2002  
 
Compiled from the data of University of Michigan 
All China Data Center, Provincial Statistics 
                                                        
28 Unfortunately, here are the limits of the analysis where reasons of these shifts or the prevalence of the same type dynamics, 
the possible consequences of the shifts and the possible mutual impact of neighboring similar or different type dynamics 
remain hidden. To trace down the reasons and impacts is the function of an empirical survey.  
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Map 3b.  
Spatial distribution of different types of transformation dynamics  




Compiled from the data of University of Michigan 
   All China Data Center, Provincial Statistics 
 
 
Similar dominance and shift of dominant dynamics is revealed at prefecture level on Map 
4a and Map 4b., and Table 5: the shift from absolute to relative retreat of the output of units 
pertaining  to  the  party state  network.  What  we  can  perceive  comparing  the  first  and  the 
second periods is that here too, all kinds of shifts may occur from any type of transformation 
dynamics.   
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Table 5.  
Shifting dominant dynamics at prefecture level within 1999 and 2004  
 
Compiled from the data of University of Michigan 
All China Data Center, City Statistics 
 
Map  4a.  and  4b.  shows  that  there  are  regions,  sometimes  whole  provinces,  where 
provincial and prefecture level dominant dynamics do not match, the most striking differences 
are in Jiangsu, Heilongjiang, Guizhou, Chongqing, and Sichuan. We may conclude that it is 
possible that characteristic shifts of the type of dynamics and frequency of shift at prefecture 
level  are  different  than  in  the  higher  level  aggregations.  One  can  also  detect  two  steady 
clustering of shifts at prefecture level from relative and absolute retreat of the network towards 
absolute  retreat  of  the  emergent  field  in  the  second  period.  This  has  occurred  in  Jiangsu 
province and in Guizhou and Chongqing and part of Sichuan province.  
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Map 4a.  
Different types of transformation dynamics and their spatial dispersion 





Compiled from the data of University of Michigan 
All China Data Center, City Statistics 
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Map 4b. 
 Different types of transformation dynamics and their spatial dispersion  





Compiled from the data of University of Michigan 
All China Data Center, City Statistics 
 
 
Major  conclusions  of  the  so far  analysis  are  the  following:  spatial  configurations  at 
provincial  and  prefecture  level  are  non conventional.  Different  types  of  transformation 
dynamics  are  not  correlating  with  any  absolute  economic  indicators.  Dominant  type  of 
transformation  dynamics,  the  “absolute  retreat  of  the  network”  at  different  aggregations 
corresponds to the theoretical concept of system transformation: the retreat of the network 
from the economic subfield and the emergence of the field outside the network. There are 
shifts  of  dominant  dynamics  in  time.  However,  under  macroeconomic  growth,  both  on 
national, provincial and prefecture levels, those variations of transformation dynamics prevail  
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that are overwhelmingly connected to the growth of the market field, while the party state field 
is growing, stagnating or declining.  
Since late 2008, however, global downturn began to hit the country’s domestic economies. 
Different dimensions of the national economic development reflected on Figure 1. (such as 
GDP,  export,  import,  investments  in  fixed  assets,  foreign  exchange  reserves  and  FDI)  are 
shifting to slower pace, stagnation or decline. New economic and social tensions arise from this 
new dynamics differentiated in space, adding up to the unsolved former ones, connected to 
growth. These new tensions are even harder to be dealt with in the context of global downturn 
and its direct social and economic consequences in a deeply integrated economic system. This 
global impact had also influenced the dynamics of transformation. 
SHIFTING TRANSFORMATION DYNAMICS, PROJECTIONS OF POLITICAL 
TRANSFORMATION AND UNCERTAINTIES 
 
While, as we stressed, no correlation was found between types of transformation dynamics and 
indicators  of  economic  level,  quite  strong  and  significant  correlation  is  revealed  between 
certain  type  of  transformation  dynamics  and  the  dynamics  of  certain  economic  indicators, 
especially those more sensitive to global growth or recession. These are the dynamics of the 
GDP, the number of employees and total retail sales of consumer goods. Partly owing to this 
correlation,  we  project  that  global  recession  that  brings  about  a  macroeconomic  decline 
differentiated in space will also change the type of dominant dynamics in the country. Those 
so far insignificant types of transformation dynamics will become dominant when the market 
field is overwhelmingly declining while the party state field is growing, stagnating or declining.  
Our further hypothesis is that in the context of macroeconomic slow downs, accumulating 
social  tensions  and  its  local  disparities  the  new  dominant  transformation  dynamics  will 
enhance  the  prospects  of  a  political  transformation.  This  will  occur  to  spatially  different 
extents  through  the  expectable  drive  for  channeling  mass  protests.  Statistical  testing  that 
demonstrated correlation between economic dynamics and transformation dynamics allows 
this projection. Projection which will follow below naturally cannot be as subtle as the first part 
of  the  paper  that  was  based  on  direct  facts,  coherent  statistics,  differentiated  at  national, 
provincial and prefecture levels. This part is based on theoretical, statistical and empirical facts 
that indirectly support the supposed consequences of economic slow down or decline.  
Theoretically,  the  projection  relies  on  the  IPS  model’s  ideas  on  worsening  economic 
conditions and adaptation efforts. According to the model, actions within party state network 
occur when extractable and distributable resources decline. This will harden the constraints of 
self reproduction of the network. Stronger adaptation efforts develop when both hardening 
economic  constraints  from  outside  the  network  and  reproduction  constraints  within  the  
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network  are  coinciding.  Such  coinciding  constraints  pre empted  and  accompanied  political 
transformation in party states in 1989 and early 1990s. According to the model, adaptation 
pressures are owed to the high systemic sensitivity to worsening economic conditions. This is a 
result  of  the  institutionalized  network  of  dependency  and  interest  promotion  that  strongly 
intertwines  party state   and  economic  decision makers.  Under  these  structural  specifics 
political  conditions  have  direct  economic  while  economic  conditions  have  direct  political 
consequences. The model also describes the composing elements of the two fold process of 
retreat  of  the  network  from  the  political  sub field  and  the  components  of  the  process  of 
emergence and expansion of field outside the network that allow empirical identification of 
those. Empirical testing in Hungary and Romania providing different examples of direction 
and  speed  of  these  twofold  changes  underlie  theoretical  stances.  Self similarities  of  the 
structure and operation in space and different aggregation levels demonstrated by the model 
allow  for  the  projection  of  those  ideas  to  provincial  and  prefecture  levels.  Further,  the 
structural background of different distributions of power described by the model allow for the 
study of the differences in space and different levels.  
However, further uncertainties in the projection arise since we do not have experience on 
the reversed sequence of transformation, when political transformation comes second, rather 
simultaneously  or  first.  We  do  not  have  its  theoretical  description  either.  Based  on  the 
theoretical assumption, we suppose that adaptation pressure in this pattern will be increasing 
in the close future. This projection is supported by evidence that economic constraints from 
outside the network are hardening and so are reproduction constraints within the network.  
We also know that this impact will be spatially selective, inciting spatially disparate adaptation 
efforts.  It  will  depend  on  several  factors:  the  different  extent  of  development  of  the  local 
emergent field; and the different impact of the global crisis on them; as well as the selective 
impact on the network through aid programs; the direct global impact on the network; and 
indirectly, through interaction with the emergent field. 
Statistically the following part is also a projection. This is based on the so far sensitivity of 
the type of dynamics to the change of economic indicators we have pointed out in the first part 
of the paper (with ETA square). Sensitivity was shown in the correlation and its significance 
between the change of GDP, employment and total retail sales of consumer goods and types of 
transformation dynamics. Since transformation dynamics is sensitive to economic dynamics, 
we project the dominance of a new type of dynamics for the near future.29  
Empirical  data  are  also  indirect:  for  example,  here  is  the  case  of  Romania,  where 
neither political nor economic reforms were implemented during the self reproduction of the 
system. When adaptation pressures increased, the retreat of the net was sudden, the time to 
                                                        
29 We know that impact and transformation dynamics must be also spatially differentiated spatially, but lacking concise data is 
too early to prove statistically.  
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the development of the emergent field (both in political and economic sub fields) was relatively 
long.  Transformation  of  different  sub fields  was  simultaneous  in  a  context  of  cumulated 
uncertainty and stretched out economic crisis. In the case of Hungary increased adaptation 
pressures incited simultaneously by hardening resource constraints within and outside the net 
led to gradual political transformation first in an environment of cumulated uncertainty and 
economic  crisis.  Since  political  transformation  was  either  first,  or  simultaneous,  neither 
Hungary, nor Romania had an evolved emergent field outside the network in the economic 
sub sphere when political transformation occurred. Thus, economic and political conditions of 
political  transformation  were  certainly  different  of  those  in  the  case  of  China  where  the 
emergent field has been evolved by thise stage.  
 The economic conditions predicted by the model for implications of political change are 
reflected  by  a  further  indirect  empirical  experience  in  China:  the  semi free  elections  at 
township and county levels between 1995 and 2002 (Lai, 2006).  We argue that semi free 
elections meant the emergence of an instrument partly belonging outside the network and the 
retreat of one of the composing elements of the network: the appointment of governors and 
vice governors and at times that of party secretaries. The uncertainty of this projection is that 
events  occurred  several  levels  lower  than  our  statistical  and  empirical  analysis.  However, 
economic decline pre empted overwhelming cases of semi free elections in China at township 
level.30  Reasons  for  the  retreat  were  similar  to  those  pressures  revealed  above:  economic 
troubles, social grievances, incapacity of extract further resources. Motivations to implement a 
partial instrument of the emergent field – the semi free elections – were similar to those in 
Romania and Hungary: to channel grievances, get rid of responsibility, and achieve further 
extraction of resources. 31  
We can also see two maps below. Map 5a depicts the type of transformation dynamics at 
prefecture level characteristic to the region when in 1998 300 cases of semi free elections at 
township level occurred.32 The characteristic type was the relative retreat of the party state 
field. (Map. 5a)  
 
 
                                                        
30 The Causes and Effects of the Development of Semi Competitive Elections at the Township Level in China since the 1990s , By 
Hairong Lai, Thesis submitted in fulfillment for the degree of PhD, Department of Political Science, Central European University, 
Budapest, January 2008 
31 Unfortunately, we do not know about the type of transformation dynamics at the time of decision at the given level (neither at 
township  nor at  the  supervising county  level).  We  do  not  know  either  to  what  extent  changes  of  the  type  of  transformation 
dynamics  drive  decision makers  sensitive  and  motivated  for  "innovations".  We  do  not  know  either  to  what  extent  the 
transformation  dynamics  of  higher  level  aggregations  make  decision makers  receptive  (or  motivated,  neutral  or  resistive)  to 
possible changes at lower level aggregations.   
32 Unfortunately, we do not have data on the type of transformation dynamics for 1995 when there were 10 cases of township level 
semi free elections.  
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Map 5a.  
Relative and absolute retreat of the network at prefectures where  





  prefectures with at least one township where semi competitive 
elections were held are depicted with yellow  
  prefectures with county level semi competitive elections with green 
border lines 
Compiled from the data of University of Michigan, All China Data 
Center, City Statistics and of the research data of LAI, Hairong 2008 
 
However, the frequency of semi free elections significantly increased in the region to close 
to 2000 cases when the characteristic dynamics at prefecture level in those regions shifted to 
the  dominance  of  absolute  retreat  of  the  emerging  field  (Map  5b),  the  type  we  predict  to 
become dominant during the coming years on national level.   
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Map 5b.  
Relative and absolute retreat of the network at prefectures where  





  prefectures with at least one township where semi competitive 
elections were held are depicted with yellow 
  prefectures with county level semi competitive elections with green 
border lines 
Compiled from the data of University of Michigan, All China Data 
Center, City Statistics and of the research data of LAI, Hairong 2008 
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Concluding  the  above,  projection  on  the  implications  on  the  chances  for  initiation  of 
political transformation are supported indirectly both by theoretical, statistical and empirical 
evidences. Economic decline of the last months in China might be initial signs of the growing 
frequency of the new transformation dynamics due to growing external and internal pressures 
that might incite stronger adaptation efforts also on the political subfield. 
Strong  macroeconomic  fundamentals  in  China  and  large  balance  of  payment  surpluses 
made the initial hit less dramatic than in many other countries. However, expected positive 
impacts of state programs developments abroad and domestically take time, even in case of 
prompt  economic  policy  decisions  to  revitalize  the  economy.  Contrarily,  consequences  of 
unfavorable external impacts build up fast in a deeply integrated economy through trade and 
FDI. Signs of slow down in economy caused by decelerating FDI and export growth, weaker 
domestic demand, declining employment, and mass lay offs are already detectable, and further 
declines are expected.  
INITIAL SIGNS OF FORMING PRECONDITIONS AND GROWING ADAPTATION 
PRESSURES  
 
According to World Bank quarterly analysis China’s economy has slowed down considerably in 
the first 10 months of 2008 with industrial value added growth sliding even more steeply in 
October to 8.2 percent (year on year), the first single digit growth since 2001.33  According to 
January’s official report, China's economic growth dropped to 6.8 percent in the three months 
through December, compared with a year earlier. Analysts have cut forecasts of 2009 economic 
growth to as low as 5 percent.34 December 2008 quarterly update of the World Bank forecasted 
that  private  sector  investment  is  likely  to  be  weighed  down  by  the  unfavorable  external 
prospects and continued weakness in real estate. Private consumption growth is likely to soften 
in 2009. It is predicted that 95 percent of exporters with medium sized assets may fail in the 
next three years. China’s business of that size provide three quarters of urban jobs, 60 percent 
of  the  GDP,  and  will  largely  impact  on  million  of  migrant  workers  and  new  entrants.  35  
                                                        
33 China Quarterly Update, December 2008 
http://go.worldbank.org/4Z57X7K3M0 
34 “China: Up to 26 million migrants now jobless” By Anita Chang, The Associated Press, Feb. 2, 2009, 7:49a.m. 
Chang,  Feb.  2,  2009,  referring  to  Chen  Xiwen,  director  of  the  Central  Rural  Work  Leading  Group,  central 
government advisory body 
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ap/world/6242084.html 
35 Higher labor costs are adding to the burden of exporters already squeezed by a rising yuan, and increased prices for raw 
materials and energy „China Boomtown Withers as Buyers Push Worker Rights”, John Liu, Stephanie Wong, December 
8, 2008 23:01 EST http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aPWSbqzzJlG4&refer=home#  
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Including students who graduated in 2008 and had not found work, it is forecasted that there 
would be more than 7 million university and college graduates hunting for jobs in 2009.36  
How  would  the  new  dominant  transformation  dynamics  attain  locations  with  different 
stages of transformation? Overall growth and export developments not only mask significant 
differences between sectors but these sectoral trends have regional implications. Disparities in 
the implication of possible impacts suggest spatial differences in the size of economic tensions 
and social conflicts that may develop. Map 6. depicts the provinces where the dynamics of FDI 
inflow had the most impact that are presumably the most exposed to decline owing to global 
crisis. One can see that most of the FDI went to coastal provinces and even if high, there were 
some that have been declining over the examined period.  
Map 6.  
 Level and dynamics of change of the FDI at provinces between 1990 and 2006  
 
Compiled from the data of University of Michigan 
All China Data Center, Provincial Statistics 
                                                        
36 “China seen facing wave of unrest in 2009”, by Chris Buckley referring to Huang Huo, interviewed  reporter of Xinhua 
News Agency, Tue Jan 6, 2009 6:27am EST 
http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCATRE5050F520090106?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel= 
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The economic impact of the international turmoil on China is set to intensify37 since China 
is strongly export sensitive. About 40 percent of the GDP is provided by exports. Expectations 
are for a sharp reduction in export growth as the impact of the international turmoil deepens in 
the US and Europe and it starts to hit demand in many emerging markets.  
The Chinese government reported in mid December 2008 that in November, for the first 
time in seven years, exports declined. Exports are expected to fall by 19 percent in the first 
quarter  of  2009  due  to  global  recession.38  Overall  export  developments  mask  significant 
differences between sectors. In the toy industry alone – which produces the 70 percent of the 
world’s toy, half of the 3,631 companies had gone under in 2008.39 China's demand for oil is 
falling sharply and inventories are surging as the global economic downturn is gradually being 
felt. Industries such as the home appliance and steel sectors are seeing decreasing orders, with 
many steel makers suspending or cutting production, in turn leading to weakening demand for 
oil and gas.40 Downturn is already felt in construction, which is one of the biggest drivers of 
China's expansion, contributing a quarter of fixed asset investment and employing 77 million 
people.41  
Map 7. suggests the potential spatial impact of export decline according to the export share 
in the provincial level GDP. Presumably, from the point of view of export share in the GDP, the 
most vulnerable are Guangdong (91.53%), Shanghai (91.24%) and Jiangsu (60.55%), where 
external factors accumulate: they are also the major attraction for the FDI (Map 6.), and where 
the  largest  is  the  share  of  the  market  in  output  value  compared  to  the  state owned  and 
collective units and are the most influential provinces in macroeconomic growth.  
                                                        
37 „Negative economic indicators pile up as China is hit by global capitalist crisis”by Jorge Martin Friday,  In Defense 
of  Marxism,  12.  December,  2008  based  on  the  report  of  the  annual  meeting  of  the  Central  Economic  Work  Conference. 
http://www.marxist.com/china-hit-by-global-capitalist-crisis.htm 
38 Representative of the National Bureau of information cited in „China's Exports Probably Declined Most in a Decade” referred 
source:  http://www.bloomberg.com/  December  01 09 2009  http://news.stonebtb.com/Global_Trade/15641 China s Exports 
Probably Declined Most in a Decade in December.shtml 
39 “In China, anger rises as economy falls” by Barbara Demick Los Angeles Times 
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la fg china politics12 2008dec12,0,2413482.story  based  on  figures  from  the 
General Administration of Customs.  
40 “China's oil demand falls sharply amid global crisis: top producer”, BEIJING (AFP) 
Nov 16, 2008. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i4rqcwkT0acYlI7GFWNVUYjDo3Rw 
41  „Negative economic indicators pile up as China is hit by global capitalist crisis”  reported by  Jorge Martin, 
referring to Qu Hongbin, the chief China economist at HSBC, 12 December, 2008 http://www.marxist.com/china-hit-by-
global-capitalist-crisis.htm 
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Map 7.  
Export ratio in the GDP in 2007 
 
 
Compiled from the data of China Statistical Yearbook 2008 and of 
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, Import and 
Export by Province and Cities [2007/1 12] 
 
Deceleration  has  strong  impact  on  employment.  Unemployment  is  already  rising, 
according to official figures. However, official statistics do not include all of the country's army 
of migrant workers which in many cases are not registered to work in the urban areas and who 
are  going  to  be  the  worst  hit  by  the  crisis.  Real  unemployment  rate  including  migrant 
unemployed is contended to 12% rather than the official 4 percent predicted to worsen to 14 
percent by next year.42 In January 2009, already up to 26 million of migrant workers from the 
130 million are supposed to be unemployed.43 
Differences  in  vulnerability  are  further  increased  politically  if  we  examine  Map  8.  that 
suggests the locations of possible major tensions according to the ratio of temporary inter 
provincial migrants. Spatial distribution of the target provinces of migrants are in accord with 
                                                        
42 „Negative economic indicators …”  Martin, 2008 
43 “China: Up to 26 million ..” Chang, Feb. 2, 2009, Chang, Feb. 2, 2009, referring to Chen Xiwen, director of the 
Central Rural Work Leading Group, central government advisory body. 
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those of largest share of private GOV, largest export share in GDP and the major targets of FDI. 
The map simultaneously shows the ratio and size between those migrants who migrate from 
the given province and who migrated to that province. Emerging possible tensions in this case 
are reflected in two ways: the ratio and size of those who formerly migrated from the province 
and become entrapped in their province, many times landless, due to the decline of manpower 
needs in other provinces and the size of the tensions they might create when they are laid off in 
masses  in  their  target  provinces  owing  to  close downs  or  production  decline.  A  recent 
government survey showed that slightly more than 15 percent of China's estimated 130 million 
migrant workers have returned to their hometowns and are now unemployed. Another 5 or 6 
million new migrants enter the labor market each year, all together, 25 to 26 million rural 
migrant workers are now coming under pressures for employment.44  
Map 8.  
The number of temporary migrant workers migrating  
from and in to the given province in 2000  
 
 
Compiled from the data of TAUBMANN, Wolfgang 2003 
 
 
                                                        
44 “China: Up to 26 million.” Chang, Feb. 2, 2009, referring to Chen Xiwen, director of the Central Rural Work Leading 
Group, central government advisory body.  
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Tensions are already detectable in many of these provinces. Factory closures and rising 
unemployment in the Pearl River Delta and eastern coastal regions are sparking labor unrest, 
as  workers  stage  demonstrations  to  demand  their  back  pay  and  severance  benefits  from 
factories now in administration.45  
Map 9. shows that spatial differences in sensitivity to global impact are not only among 
provinces  but  also  within  those.  We  suppose  that  possible  tensions  are  going  to  be 
concentrated to more dynamically developing prefectures presumably more sensitive to global 
impact. These are the prefectures where according to the map the level of GDP was high and 
further  grew  during  the  examined  period.  Presumably,  at  these  prefectures  the  level  of 
urbanization and industrialization is higher, and so are the concentration of migrant workers 
and the ratio of export. Tensions emerging from these facts might add up to spatial tensions 
that developed due to the fact that these prefectures are surrounded by ones with opposite 
dynamics: low level GDP with declining tendency. According to a recent report by the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) close to 33 million urban residents lost their jobs in the 
second half of 2008.46.  
                                                        
45 The Shenzhen Labor and Social Security Bureau on Tuesday publicized the names of 30 companies that owe a combined 12 
million yuan (U.S. $1.75 million) in back pay to workers. The Bureau demanded that executives report to the local labor authorities 
within 30 days, Xinhua said. In some places, the government has paid workers out of its own coffers to avoid further social unrest. 
Xinhua said the township government of Zhangmutou had pledged a payout to workers at the bankrupt Smart Union factory in 
Dongguan city worth 24 million yuan (U.S.$3.5 million). “Global Crisis Hits Chinese Migrant Workers” RFA reports 
Wednesday, November 05, 2008 -  http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/migrants-11042008054042.html 
46  “Hu  Jintao’s  Great  Leap  Backward”  by  Willy  Lam,  Far  Eastern  Economic  Review,  Posted  January  9,  2009 
http://www.feer.com/essays/2009/january/hu-jintaos-great-leap-backward 
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Map 9. 
 Connection of the level and the trends of economic development  




Compiled from the data of University of Michigan, 
All China Data Center, City Statistics 
 
Strong  macroeconomic  fundamentals  in  China  and  large  balance  of  payment  surpluses 
made the initial hit less dramatic than in many other countries. However, expected positive 
impacts of state development programs abroad and domestically take time, even in case of 
prompt  economic  policy  decisions  to  revitalize  the  economy.  Contrarily,  consequences  of 
unfavorable external impacts build up fast in a deeply integrated economy through trade and 
FDI. Signs of slow down in economy caused by decelerating FDI and export growth, weaker 
domestic demand, declining employment, and mass lay offs are already detectable, and further 
declines are expected.  
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Economic  downturn  and  emerging  political  tensions  cause  prompt  official  reactions. 
Chinese experts say governments at different levels plan to earmark money for contingency 
reserve funds to help unpaid employees, most of them migrant workers. Plans were also being 
put  forward  for  a  mandatory  reserve  fund  contribution  by  companies  at  start up.  China's 
national  police  chief has  called  on  police  officers  to  mend  relations  with  ordinary  Chinese 
people, and to be careful of how they use force to settle disputes.47 In order to limit the impact 
of  workers'  protests  new  instructions  on  police  behavior  have  been  issued.  The  idea  is  to 
prevent  small  scale  protests  from  escalating  into  massive  riots  or  becoming  generalized.48 
However, the outlook is not optimistic: "If in 2009 there is a large number of unemployed rural 
migrant laborers who cannot find work for half a year or longer, milling around in cities with 
no income, the problem will be even more serious". The report also stressed that protests are 
increasingly politicized, making it harder for officials to douse them by force or cash hand 
outs. “Social conflicts have already formed a certain social, mass base so that as soon as there is 
an  appropriate  fuse  it  always  swiftly  explodes  and  clashes  escalate  quickly”.49  Workers  are 
seeking  protection  and  channels  of  forwarding  dissatisfaction.  Not  only  occasional  mass 
protests develop in more frequency and larger scope and more violent, but also horizontal 
institutionalization of interests emerge.50 The Congress of the All China Federation of Trade 
Unions announced that membership has reached 209 million, 9 million above their target for 
September and an increase of 16 million since January 2008. Of the total membership, 67 
million are migrants, a third of who are now unionized. Demands are growing that the Union 
take  more  militant  action.    Even  members  of  the  intelligentsia  have  become  more  vocal, 
demanding political change in a petition released in mid December that was modeled after the 
1977  one  that  challenged  the  Soviet  Union's  domination  of  Czechoslovakia.  "In  the  world, 
authoritarian systems are approaching the dusk of their endings," says the document, signed 
by more than 300 prominent people with further rising number of signers ever since.51  
Lately,  pressures  to  channel  social  grievances  to  avoid  direct  confrontations  grow, 
forecasting increasing mass protests in the coming decades52. Responses however may be two 
fold:  one  is  the  routine  reaction  by  increasing  political  strictness  and  clamp down  before 
movements become politicized and propagate, delaying political transformation. The other is 
gradually retreating from the political subfield by building institutions to channel grievances 
                                                        
47  “Global  Crisis  Hits  Chinese  Migrant  Workers”  China  Confidential.  Wednesday,  November  05,  2008  RFA 
reports, http://chinaconfidential.blogspot.com/2008/11/global-crisis-hits-chinese-migrant.html 
48  „Negative economic indicators ..” Martin, 2008 
49 „China seen facing wave of unrest …”, Buckley, 2009 
50 In Hunan province demobilized and retired soldiers formed a 100,000 strong "anti corruption brigade" of laid off workers, 
poor peasants and lower class intellectuals. „Rural Reform and revolt in China” by Heiko Khoo In Defense of Marxism, 
Tuesday, 21 October 2008  
http://www.google.hu/search?hl=hu&q=%E2%80%9ERural+Reform+and+revolt+in+China%E2%80%9D+&meta= 
51 “In China, anger rises … Demick,.2008  
52 (China Security Spring 2007 p.3). Yu Jianrong director of the Rural Development Institute's Social Issues Research Center at 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences addressing the CCP leadership, cited by Heiko Khoo in Rural Reform and …”, 2008   
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before they become swell and propagate, enhancing political transformation.  Both have their 
reality  and  might  be  implemented  jointly  or  alternatively  and  emerge  spatially  differently. 
Signs of the first option are already there: during his visit to the military headquarter, Hu 
Jintao,  apart  from  heeding  the  “absolute  leadership  of  the  party,”  military  personnel  were 
urged by Mr. Hu to “comprehensively raise the army’s ability to tackle different types of threat 
to [national and social] security, to improve its capability for multifaceted military missions, 
and to strengthen its ability to engage in non war related military operations.”53 
 
 
                                                        
53 Cited in Hu Jintao’s Great Leap …”, Lam,  2009  
  
  38 
CONCLUSION 
 
This  paper  analyzes  the  impact  of  global  financial  and  economic  crisis  on  China’s 
transformation process. First, it details the recent social and economic consequences of the 
global crisis in China and second, it deals with the effects these consequences have on the 
system’s transformation. The paper builds on the Interactive Party state Model for introducing 
the concept of system transformation as the process of retreat of the party state network and 
the emergence of the new system outside of it. According to the model, retreat and emergence 
may  occur  first  in  economic  or  political  subfield,  depending  on  the  specifics  of  power 
distribution in the party state network.  Using this concept, an operative tool was introduced: 
the dynamics of transformation allowing for the measurement of the multiple varieties in the 
direction  and  speed  of  the  emergent  field  relative  to  that  of  the  retreating  network.  The 
different types of transformation dynamics, their disparities in space and shifts in time are 
analyzed in the Chinese party state, under the conditions of economic transformation first in 
an  authoritarian  political  regime,  accompanied  by  macroeconomic  growth  increasingly 
influenced by global dynamics. It also detailed the dominant types of transformation dynamics 
during the examined period. The correlation between changes in the dynamics of economic 
indicators and different types of transformation dynamics was demonstrated. Based on that, it 
draws  some  conclusions  on  the  characteristics  of  the  possible  shift  of  dynamics  of 
transformation, as a result of macroeconomic decline and disparate spatial impacts owing to 
global  recession.  Our  hypothesis  is  that  while  overall  growth  directly  fuelled  domestic 
economic growth and indirectly contributed to the acceleration of economic transformation, 
overall  recession  will  directly  fuel  domestic  economic  deceleration  and  might  indirectly 
contribute to the acceleration of political transformation. It argues that the global recession, 
economic downturn and changing dominant dynamics in China might resemble the internal 
and external economic preconditions that have lead to the process of political transformation 
first in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union though under a different dominant transformation 
dynamics. Based on the theoretical projection of the model, the empirical experiences and its 
description  in  Eastern  Europe  and  Soviet  Union,  it  presumes  that  the  changed  dominant 
transformation dynamics could influence the commencement of a political transformation at 
locations  directly  or  indirectly  most  severely  attained  by  the  fall back.    It  underlies  this 
argument indirectly with the fact that prefectures where the number of semi free elections 
dramatically increased at township and county levels in 2002 in China, had overwhelmingly 
the same type of transformation dynamics as is presupposed to become dominant in the near 
future  nation wide.  Moreover,  the  paper  points  to  the  fact  that  though  semi free  elections 
emerged from 1995 onwards, the dramatic increase in the number semi free elections occurred  
  39 
in 2002, when a shift in dominant dynamics may be detected at affected prefectures. The type 
from which the shift occurred and to which it shifted corresponds to the nationwide dominant 
dynamics that existed until 2006 7 and the one predicted as an impact of the global shock from 
than on.  
What we have seen that transformation dynamics are quite variable in time at sub national 
level. Short term changes of transformation dynamics might only temporary and locally de 
legitimate  the  party  and  legitimacy  might  be  regained.  However,  even  this  shift  could  be 
reversible. Yet, on the other hand, the case of semi free elections gives the impression that 
even  if  in  short run,  the  network  reacted  to  this  change  sensitively  with  retreat  from  the 
political sub field. On the other hand, this type of dynamics might be prolonged due to the 
direct impact of global crisis. The longer lasting tendency of the given dynamics might lead to 
further steps, locally or at national level giving way to irreversible processes of retreat and 
emergence and their propagation.  
There is no experience on the process of political transformation second in a context of 
advanced economic transformation among transforming party state systems. What we have is 
only  economic  transformation  second  in  a  context  of  advanced  political  transformation. 
Similarities in these two are the substantially underdeveloped emergent field and the strength 
of the network sphere in the given sub fields in both cases. There are no developed horizontal 
organizations on the spot to take over functions from the retreating network. This gives the 
chance  for  the  state  to retain  functions  of  intervention  and  for  those  fragmented  interests 
within the network the advantage to form into horizontal organizations during retreat and find 
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